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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(3)(a) of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Whether the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) 
(hereinafter, "Subsection 4(a)") apply to counterclaims. (Order of the Supreme Court of 
State of Utah, dated May 19, 2006, granting certiorari). This issue presents a matter of 
statutory interpretation, which is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See 
e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, \ 17, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203. 
Issue No, 2: Whether the requirements of Subsection 4(a) apply regardless of the 
availability of remedies to a property owner under the Residence Lien Restriction and 
Lien Recovery Fund Act. (Order of the Supreme Court of State of Utah, dated May 19, 
2006, granting certiorari). This issue also is one of statutory interpretation which is 
reviewed for correctness. Rushton, 1999 UT 36,1f 37, 977 P.2d at 1203.] 
This Court granted certiorari on the original petition that was first filed by Appellant 
Bill Hart, d/b/a Hart Construction ("Hart") as to the two above-listed issues. The Court 
also stated that certiorari was granted on the cross-petition that was later-filed by 
Appellee Joel Sill ("Sill") as to the issue of whether Subsection 4(a) creates a 
jurisdictional bar. Pursuant to Rules 51(b)(4) and 24(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Hart expressly reserves all rights to fully brief and address the merits of Sill's 
arguments regarding the claimed "jurisdictional" nature of Subsection 4(a) after such 
arguments have first been briefed by Sill for presentation to the Court. Hart notes, 
however, that the Court need not even reach any analysis as to whether Subsection 4(a) is 
jurisdictional, since on its face Subsection 4(a) does not apply to this case to begin with, 
as discussed more fully in this brief. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
The following controlling statutes are applicable to this appeal:2 
Utah Code § 38-l-ll(4)(a) (2001): [Mechanics' Liens] Enforcement -Time for -Lis 
pendens -Action for debt not affected -Instructions and form affidavit and motion. 
(4)(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this chapter 
involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien claimant shall 
include with the service of the complaint on the owner of the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's 
rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and 
Lien Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the 
owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner 
may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code § 38-11-107 (2001): [Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund 
Act] Restrictions upon maintaining a lien against residence or owner's interest in 
the residence. 
(1) A person qualified to file a lien upon an owner-occupied residence and the 
real property associated with that residence under the provisions of Title 38, 
Chapter 1, Mechanics'Liens, who provides qualified services under an 
agreement effective on or after January 1, 1995, other than directly with the 
owner, shall be barred after January 1, 1995, from maintaining a lien upon that 
residence and real property or recovering a judgment in any civil action against 
the owner or the owner-occupied residence to recover monies owed for 
qualified services provided by that person if: . . . . (Emphasis added). 
2
 The statutes determinative of this case that are therefore cited in this brief are those that 
were in place when Hart filed his answer and counterclaim in February of 2002. 
Utah Code § 38-11-204 (2001): [Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act] Claims against the fund -Requirement to make a 
claim -- Qualifications to receive compensation, 
(3) To recover from the [Residential Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery 
F]und5 regardless of whether the residence is occupied by the owner, a 
subsequent owner, or the owner or subsequent owner's tenant or lessee, a 
qualified beneficiary shall establish that: 
(b) the owner has paid in full the original contractor, licensed or 
exempt from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction 
Trades Licensing Act, real estate developer, or factory built housing 
retailer under Subsection (3)(a) with whom the owner has a written 
contract in accordance with the written contract and any 
amendments to the contract, and: . . . . (Emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This action was filed by Plaintiff Joel Sill ("Sill"), who served a complaint upon 
Defendant Bill Hart, d/b/a Hart Construction ("Hart") relating to the parties' agreement 
for the construction by Hart of improvements to real property owned by Sill. Hart then 
filed with the district court and served upon Sill's attorneys an answer that also included 
a counterclaim (the "Counterclaim") in which Hart sought, among other things, to 
foreclose a mechanics' lien securing payment from Sill for the improvements Hart made 
to Sill's property. 
After two and a half years of litigation and discovery, in the week just before the 
start of trial, Sill for the first time raised to Hart an argument that Hart's mechanics' lien 
foreclosure claim was defective because Hart had not served upon Sill a form affidavit 
and motion for summary judgment, and instructions for use of those forms in exercise of 
certain rights available to some homeowners under Utah's Residence Lien Restriction 
and Lien Recovery Fund Act (Utah Code §§ 38-11-101 e/ seq. - hereinafter, the 
"LRFA"). Sill argued that service of such LRFA instructions and forms was required of 
Hart by Utah Code section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (identified and referred to above, and 
hereinafter, as "Subsection 4(a)") of Utah's mechanics' lien statutes (Utah Code §§38-
1-1 etseq). 
The case proceeded to trial The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hart, awarding 
him the full principal amount of $314,500.00 that he requested on his unjust enrichment 
and mechanics' lien claims. Hart also ultimately was awarded an additional $303,305.55 
in attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. 
When Hart attempted to reduce the jury's verdict to a judgment, Sill opposed that 
effort by arguing that attorney fees and prejudgment interest were not recoverable from 
him, and that Hart's mechanics' lien could not be foreclosed because Sill had not been 
served with LRFA instructions and forms when Hart served his Counterclaim on Sill's 
attorneys, which Sill claimed was required by Subsection 4(a). Sill did not object to the 
amount of fees and interest. 
After extensive briefing and oral argument by the parties, the district court issued a 
well-reasoned "Memorandum Decision" (the "Decision") rejecting Sill's Subsection 4(a) 
arguments and declaring: 
The plain language of Subsection (4) compels the conclusion that the Utah 
Legislature limited the obligation of a lien claimant to serve a homeowner 
with the materials referenced in Subsection (4)(a) to those instances in 
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which the lien claimant was initiating an action through service of a 
complaint and not a counterclaim. First, while "[t]he word 'action' 
without more is arguably broad enough to encompass any type of judicial 
proceeding, including counterclaims" (Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal 
Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, 81 (2nd Cir. 2003) (citations 
omitted)), read in the context of Subsection (4), it is qualified by the 
reference to "service of the complaint." Second, this reference to a 
complaint is to a pleading that is filed at the commencement of a lawsuit 
and that is commonly understood to be distinct from a counterclaim. See 
e.g., Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d at 
82; see also Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3 ("A civil action is commenced 
(1) by filing of a complaint. .., or (2) by service of a summons together 
with a copy of the complaint") & 7(a) (distinguishing a complaint from 
other pleadings). Third., had the Legislature intended Sill's construction, it 
could have easily provided for it {e.g., by substituting the words "initial 
pleading" for "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a)). [R. 1464 (Decision, p. 3 
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). A copy of the district court's 
Decision is attached hereto as Addendum No. 1)]. 
Since Sill (rather than Hart) filed this action and served a "complaint," and since 
what Hart served on Sill's attorneys was instead an answer that included the 
Counterclaim, the district court held Subsection 4(a) did not apply to this case, that Hart 
was not required to serve upon Sill any of the referenced LRFA materials, and that Hart 
was therefore entitled to recover prejudgment interest, attorney fees and costs, and to 
foreclose his mechanics' lien. (R. 1462-66 (Decision), Addendum No. 3 hereto). 
Consistent with the Decision, a "Final Judgment, Order and Decree of 
Foreclosure" (the "Order") was signed, approved as to form by legal counsel for Sill, 
and entered by the district court. The Order, among other things, confirmed the validity 
and enforceability of Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure Counterclaim and awarded all of 
the prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs claimed by Hart, the amount of which 
Sill did not dispute. (R. 1467-71). A copy of the district court's Order is attached hereto 
as Addendum No. 4. 
Sill appealed the district court's Decision. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed, 
stating that Subsection 4(a) "does not require the service specifically of a complaint," that 
"the statute here is triggered c[i]f a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien,'" and 
that for that purpose "the term 'complaint,' as it is used in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), includes 
counterclaims." Sill v. Hart, 128 P.3d 1215, 1218 & 1219, Iffl 9 & 13 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005), rehearing denied (January 5, 2006). A copy of the Court of Appeals' opinion (the 
"Opinion") is attached hereto as Addendum No. 1. The appellate court therefore 
remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether attorney fees and 
prejudgment interest were recoverable by Hart, applying Subsection 4(a) to Hart but also 
in light of Sill's failure to raise Subsection 4(a) as an affirmative defense in his reply to 
the Counterclaim. Id. at 1219, ffl[ 15-17 (Court of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 
hereto). Hart timely filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Rehearing, which was 
denied without explanation. A copy of the Court of Appeals Order denying the Petition 
for Rehearing is attached hereto as Addendum No. 2. Hart then petitioned this Court for 
a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' Opinion, which was granted. 
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II. Statement of Facts 
1. Sill owned certain real property in Summit County, Utah. (See e.g., R. 1-33 
(Sill's Complaint, fl 4 & 10)). 
2. Sill, as the owner, entered into an agreement directly with Hart, as the 
original or general contractor, for Hart to construct improvements to Sill's property. (See 
e.g., R. 1-33 (Sill's Complaint, % 11)). 
3. In January, 2002, Sill filed this action and a complaint against Hart 
claiming, among other things, a breach of the parties' construction agreement. (See e.g., 
R. 1-33 (Sill's Complaint)). 
4. Sill then served his complaint on Hart. (See e.g., R. 34-36). 
5. In February, 2002, Hart filed an answer to Sill's complaint, and included a 
counterclaim, and later an amended counterclaim (identified and referred to above, and 
hereinafter, collectively, as the "Counterclaim"), in which Hart sought, among other 
things, to foreclose a mechanics' lien securing payment from Sill for the improvements 
Hart made to Sill's property. (See e.g., R. 37-58; R. 59-81). 
6. At all times throughout this case, Sill has always been represented by legal 
counsel. (See e.g., R. 1-33; district court's docket generally). 
7. Hart served his Counterclaim by mail upon Sill's attorneys of record in this 
case. (See e.g., R. 58; R. 81). 
8. After the jury awarded Hart the full $314,500.00 principal amount he 
claimed was owed by Sill, and after hearing and rejecting Sill's arguments made after the 
trial for application of Subsection 4(a) to this case, the district court awarded Hart, among 
other things, an additional combined amount of $303,305.55 in reasonable attorney fees, 
costs, and prejudgment interest. (R. 1467-71). Sill did not appeal any of the amounts 
awarded to Hart. Sill appealed only the district court's Decision rejecting his claim that 
Subsection 4(a) somehow barred recovery of attorney fees and prejudgment interest. 
(R. 1244-48, 1369-79, 1383-94, 1411-20, 1448-53, 1493). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Based upon its conclusion that Subsection 4(a) of Utah's mechanics' lien statutes 
applied to this case, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed portions of the district court's 
Decision and Order awarding to Hart more than $300,000 in attorney fees, court costs, 
and prejudgment interest upon Hart's successful prosecution of his Counterclaim to 
foreclose his mechanics' lien. The question for review by this Court is whether the Utah 
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court and in holding for the first time ever 
that Subsection 4(a) requires counterclaiming general contractors to serve upon 
homeowners who sue them instructions and forms relating to rights available to some 
homeowners as against only subcontractors under the LRFA, or else lose all of their 
rights and remedies under Utah's mechanics' lien statutes. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion is contrary to the plain language of 
Subsection 4(a) specifically, to the long-recognized intent, purpose and policy of Utah's 
mechanics' lien statutes generally, and to several cannons of statutory construction. The 
Court of Appeals' Opinion also is contrary to the LRFA under which Sill admittedly had 
no rights in this case and which Sill admits did not apply to and would not have made any 
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difference to the outcome of this case. The Court of Appeals' Opinion essentially, as a 
matter of first impression, punishes Hart for not providing Sill instructions and forms that 
Hart, as a counterclaimant, was not required to provide on the face of Subsection 4(a), 
and which Sill admits he could not have used in this case in any event. 
Subsection 4(a) expressly applies only if the lien claimant files an action and 
serves a "complaint" on the owner of residential property. In this case, it was the owner, 
Sill, who served a complaint upon Hart. As the defendant in the case, Hart indisputably 
never filed or served a complaint on Sill. Rather, Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure was 
a part of Hart's Counterclaim that was served by mail upon Sill's attorneys. 
Subsection 4(a)'s reference to service of LRFA instructions and forms with a 
"complaint," therefore, does not apply to this case. The Court of Appeals' Opinion 
applying Subsection 4(a) to Hart's Counterclaim changed the plain language of the 
statute as chosen and drafted by the Legislature. Such alterations of legislative 
enactments are in derogation of established rules of statutory construction, and if allowed 
to stand would impermissibly create traps for parties and their legal counsel who could no 
longer rely upon or follow the plain language of statutes. This Court should therefore 
reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion, and confirm that by virtue of its express reference 
to service of a "complaint" Subsection 4(a) does not apply to Hart's Counterclaim in this 
case. 
This Court should also reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion because service of 
LRFA instructions and forms that are the subject of this case would have been a 
completely useless act that would not have made any difference whatsoever to the 
outcome of this case. The LRFA instructions and forms referenced in Subsection 4(a) 
relate solely to rights available to certain homeowners as against only liens of 
subcontractors, and only after the homeowner has paid in full the original general 
contractor. Sill admits that Hart was his general contractor, not a subcontractor subject to 
the LRFA. Sill also had not paid Hart in full, as the jury found and from which Sill does 
not appeal. Sill therefore indisputably had no rights under the LRFA in this case. Since 
Subsection 4(a) expressly requires service of LRFA instructions and forms only relating 
to "available rights" of "the owner" under the LRFA, and sinceSill admittedly and 
indisputably had no such rights of any kind in this case, Subsection 4(a) does not require 
service of the referenced LRFA instructions and forms in this case which simply do not 
apply and would have been of no use to Sill whatsoever. 
This Court should reverse the Utah Court of Appeals' interpretation of 
Subsection 4(a) which is contrary to the long-recognized legislative purpose of the 
mechanics' lien statutes to protect those such as Hart who perform work upon and 
provide improvements to real property. The Court of Appeals' interpretation of 
Subsection 4(a) as an impediment to Hart's lien foreclosure Counterclaim in this case is 
contrary to the language of Subsection 4(a), and to the mechanics' lien laws generally. 
That interpretation grants to Sill a windfall in the form of a luxury home built by Hart 
without Sill having to pay for it for more than two years and without paying at all the 
accrued interest and the attorney fees that Hart had to expend forcing collection of the 
amount due and owing to him by virtue of Sill's refusal to pay. This Court should not 
reward Sill with such a windfall to Hart's substantial detriment, including as a matter of 
law under the express language of Subsection 4(a) which the Court of Appeals 
misinterpreted. This Court should instead reverse the Court of Appeals and uphold the 
district court's Decision and Order declaring Subsection 4(a) inapplicable, and otherwise 
not any bar, to Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure Counterclaim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUBSECTION 4(a) EXPRESSLY APPLIES ONLY WHEN A LIEN 
CLAIMANT FILES AND SERVES A "COMPLAINT," AND THEREFORE 
DOES NOT APPLY TO COUNTERCLAIMS 
The Court of Appeals' application of Subsection 4(a) to Hart's Counterclaim is 
contrary to the plain language of that statute. On its face Subsection 4(a) expressly 
applies only when a lien claimant files and serves on a defendant property owner a 
"complaint." At the time Sill initiated this action by filing his complaint, Subsection 4(a) 
read as follows: 
3
 While this case has been pending on appeal, Sill has paid Hart the principal amount 
owed for Hart's work upon and improvements to the Property, which the jury awarded in 
precisely the amount originally claimed by Hart, and the costs that were awarded to Hart. 
Sill has not paid, however, the prejudgment interest and attorney fee amounts awarded by 
the district court and not appealed by Sill. This Court has recognized that recovery of 
attorney fees is vitally important to mechanics' liens. "The purpose of the mechanic's 
lien is to protect those whose labor or materials have enhanced the value of property. 
[The attorney fee provision of the mechanic's lien statutes] strengthens that protection by 
ensuring someone who successfully uses a mechanic's lien to enforce a payment 
obligation for such enhancement will not ultimately bear the legal costs of that 
enforcement action. It also functions as a penalty for one who wrongly fails to pay for 
enhancement to his property." A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 
47, If 24, 94 P.3d 270, 276. 
(4)(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this 
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien 
claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of the 
residence: .... [(Utah Code § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) (emphasis added)]. 
Subsection 4(a) expressly applies only if the lien claimant files an action and 
serves a "complaint" on a homeowner to foreclose a mechanics' lien. Subsection 4(a) 
therefore does not apply to this case in which it is Sill, the homeowner, who is the 
plaintiff that filed the action and served a complaint, while Hart, the lien claimant, is the 
defendant who instead filed an answer and Counterclaim. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that Subsection 4(a) applied to Hart's answer and 
Counterclaim purportedly because "the statute is triggered [merely] if a lien claimant files 
an action to enforce a lien under the Mechanics' Liens Act involving a residence" and 
"does not require the service specifically of a complaint." Sill v. Hart, 128 P.3d 1215, 
1218, Tj 9 (emphasis added) (Court of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 hereto). That 
ruling is contrary to and writes-out the plain, and express reference in Subsection 4(a) 
specifically to a "complaint" as the only pleading with which the referenced LRFA 
instructions and forms are to be served. The Court of Appeals itself later acknowledged 
that "the statute specifically references 'the service of the complaint,'" but reasoned that 
Subsection 4(a) nevertheless applied to Hart's Counterclaim, ostensibly because "the 
term 'complaint' is frequently interpreted in Utah caselaw as including counterclaims." 
Id. at 1219, ^  13 (Court of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 hereto). The Court of 
Appeals' Opinion is an incorrect and unsupportable deviation from the language of 
Subsection 4(a), and well-settled rules of statutory construction and mechanics' lien law 
and policy. This Court should therefore reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion, and 
adopt the Decision of the district court that Subsection 4(a) has no application to Hart's 
Counterclaim in this case. 
A. The Court of Appeals' Application of Subsection 4(a) to Hart's 
Counterclaim is Contrary to the Express Statutory Language and 
Established Rules of Statutory Construction 
It is well-settled that when interpreting a statute the courts must interpret the actual 
words appearing on the face of the statute itself, reading them literally and according to 
their plain and ordinary meaning. E.g., Gillman v. Sprint Comm. Co., 2004 UT App 143, 
11 7, 91 P.3d 858, cert, denied, 98 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). Rules of statutory construction 
further require courts to "assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly" and 
therefore require that "'the statutory words are read literally....'" Id. (quotations and 
citations omitted). This Court has also held that when interpreting a statute courts must 
"not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there," Associated Gen. 
Contractors v. Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112,1f 30, 38 P.3d 291 (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
The plain, ordinary, and literal meaning of the term "complaint" appearing in 
Subsection 4(a) is the first pleading, filed by a plaintiff, to initiate a lawsuit: 
The initial pleading that starts a civil action and states the basis for the 
court's jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiffs claim, and the demand for 
relief. [Black's Law Dictionary 303 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added)]. 
The original or initial pleading by which an action is commenced under 
codes or Rules of Civil Procedure. [Black's Law Dictionary 258 (5th ed. 
1979) (emphasis added)]. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are in accord, and provide that "fa] civil action 
is commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by service of a summons 
together with a copy of the complaint in accordance with rule 4." Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a). 
By contrast, the plain and ordinary meaning of a counterclaim, which Hart filed, is 
in opposition to a "complaint." Specifically, a counterclaim is "[a] claim presented by a 
defendant in opposition to or deduction from the claim of the plaintiff." Black's Law 
Dictionary 349 (6th ed. 1990). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognize "complaints" and counterclaims as 
distinct and different, including defining them in completely different rules. See e.g., 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) ("Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer....") 
(emphasis added); id. 13(a) ("Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a 
counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against 
any opposing party...") (emphasis added). 
The Utah Legislature also recognizes that distinction and specifically uses the term 
"counterclaim" when it intends a statute to apply to counterclaims. See e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. § 42-2-10 (2005) (stating parties may not maintain "any action, suit, counterclaim, 
cross complaint, or proceeding" unless certain requirements are met) (emphasis added); 
id., § 78-7-35 (separately delineating filing fees applicable to a "complaint," and to a 
"counterclaim," and other pleadings) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Legislature was precise when it designated only one pleading {i.e., a 
"complaint") as being subject to the requirements of Subsection 4(a). The Legislature 
could easily have required that the LRFA instructions and forms referred to in 
Subsection 4(a) be served with "the complaint or the answer containing a counterclaim." 
Simpler yet, the Legislature could have used the term "pleading," instead of "complaint." 
It did not. Rather, the Legislature specifically and expressly referred exclusively to a 
"complaint" as the only pleading with which LRFA instructions and forms must be 
served. 
As shown above, long-settled rules of statutory construction require that the 
Legislature's exclusive reference to a "complaint" in Subsection 4(a) be treated as 
purposefully and advisedly adopted. Additional rules of statutory construction require 
that the exclusive reference in Subsection 4(a) to service of a "complaint" must be 
deemed to exclude application of that statute to any other pleadings, and that such 
exclusion must be respected and enforced by the courts. See e.g., State v. Hobbs, 2003 
UT App 27, If 21, 64 P.3d 1218 (noting rules of statutory construction that expression of 
one thing implies exclusion of another, and omissions in statutory language must be taken 
note of and given effect); Sorenson's Ranch School v. Oram, 2001 UT App 354, % 11, 36 
P.3d 528 (same). 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion applying Subsection 4(a) to Hart's Counterclaim 
violates all of the above rules of statutory construction, including the prohibition against 
inferring substantive terms into a statute that are not already there. It also improperly 
renders the word "complaint" as used in Subsection 4(a) meaningless, in violation of yet 
another rule of statutory construction. See e.g., Lund v. Brown, 2001 UT 75, ^ J 23, 11 
P.3d 277 ("[A]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or 
superfluous is to be avoided.") (quotations and citations omitted). The Court of Appeals 
strayed from the clear language of the statute (i.e., "complaint"), and inferred substantive 
terms (i.e., counterclaim) into the statutory text that are not there. It ignored the literal 
words of the statute advisedly chosen by the Legislature referring exclusively to a 
"complaint" to be served on the owner as the only pleading that is subject to any 
requirements of Subsection 4(a). This Court therefore should reverse the Court of 
Appeals' Opinion. 
B. The Court of Appeals' Inclusion of Counterclaims Within the 
Definition of a "Complaint" in Subsection 4(a) is Without Merit 
There is no authority to support the Court of Appeals' Opinion that the term 
"complaint," as used in Subsection 4(a), includes counterclaims. The various cases cited 
by the Court of Appeals in support of its proposition that "the term 'complaint' is 
frequently interpreted in Utah case law as including counterclaims," (Sill v. Hart, 128 
P.3d 1215, 1219, TJ13 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (Court of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 
1 hereto), are off-point and do not support that court's significant departure from the 
governing statutory language. 
The Court of Appeals' citations to State ex rel Road Comm 'n v. Parker, 13 Utah 
2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962) and Barman v. Yeager, 103 Utah 208, 134 P.2d 695, 696 
(1943), Id. (Addendum No. 1), are unavailing. Neither of those cases have any 
application to this case. They spoke merely to the pleading standards required for 
counterclaims generally (i.e., that they must state facts sufficient to support a claim for 
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relief, as distinguished from merely stating a defense to a plaintiffs complaint). Neither 
of those cases dealt with Subsection 4(a), nor involved construction of the word 
"complaint" or "counterclaim" as a statutory term, and particularly not under the rubric of 
Utah's mechanics' lien statutes. 
Nor do the mechanics' lien cases cited by the Court of Appeals support its 
application of Subsection 4(a) to Hart's Counterclaim. The For-Shor Co. v. Early, 828 
P.2d 1080 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and First Gen. Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) cases, for example, both involved lien claimants who were plaintiffs, not 
counterclaimants. Moreover, Subsection 4(a) was not even enacted until 2001, long after 
the opinions were issued in those cases. 
The only other mechanics' lien case cited by the Court of Appeals is American 
Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 185 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). That case dealt with the attorney fee provision of Utah's mechanics' lien statute, 
Utah Code Section 38-1-18. Since the court in that case held that attorney fees are 
recoverable for successfully prosecuting a counterclaim to enforce a mechanics' lien, the 
Court of Appeals cited to American Rural in this case as support for the proposition that 
"Utah courts have interpreted similar language [to Subsection 4(a)'s reference to "an 
action"] to include counterclaims." Sill, 128 P.3d at 1218, % 12 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) 
(Court of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 hereto). There is a striking difference, 
however, between the statutory language of the attorney fee provision at issue in 
American Rural, and that of Subsection 4(a) at issue in this case. The American Rural 
case therefore actually is contrary to, and highlights the impropriety of, the Court of 
Appeals' Opinion applying Subsection 4(a) to Hart's Counterclaim. 
The attorney fee provision that was at issue in American Rural stated, in its 
entirety: 
In any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, 
to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as a cost in the action. 
[Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (emphasis added)]. 
The expansive and unqualified language of section 38-1-18 allowing recovery of 
fees by the successful party "in any action" brought to enforce a mechanics' lien is 
markedly different than the limited and qualified language of Subsection 4(a), which 
states that certain forms and instructions are to be served only if the lien claimant "files 
an action" and serves a "complaint" on the homeowner. The American Rural case 
properly concluded that a mechanics' lien foreclosure counterclaim is within the attorney 
fee provision that broadly applies to "any action." That, however, simply confirms and 
highlights that Subsection 4(a) does not apply to counterclaims, since the word "action" 
is used in the attorney fee provision at issue in American Rural without limitation or 
qualification of any kind (and indeed with the expansive "any"), whereas the word 
"action" as it is used in Subsection 4(a) that is at issue in this case is specifically and 
expressly limited and qualified in that section by the term "complaint." The addition of 
the qualifying term "complaint" in Subsection 4(a), which was enacted long after the 
attorney fee provision, shows the Legislature's intent to distinguish and limit the term 
"action," as used in Subsection 4(a), from the expansive and unqualified "any action" 
language of the fee provision. Had the Legislature intended that same expansive 
application for Subsection 4(a), it would have left the term "action" unqualified as it did 
in the attorney fee provision. Instead, however, it distinguished Subsection 4(a) by 
adding the limiting and qualifying reference to a "complaint" as the only pleading with 
which LRFA instructions and forms would be served. Since the "action" to which 
Subsection 4(a) applies expressly is limited to where the lien claimant files and serves a 
"complaint," it does not apply to Hart's Counterclaim. 
The most closely analogous case to the case at bar of which Hart is aware is the 
case relied upon by the district court in its Decision: Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal 
Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73 (2nd Cir. 2003). There, the court was faced with the 
question of whether a counterclaim that was financed by an employer was barred by a 
statute stating that "[n]o labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to 
institute an action in any court... provided further, That [sic] no interested employer or 
employer association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in, 
except as a party, any such action ...." Pelella, 350 F.3d at 80 (emphasis added). The 
Pelella court correctly held that it was not, explaining: 
The word "action," without more, is arguably broad enough to 
encompass any type of judicial proceeding, including counterclaims 
We need not decide, however, whether the word "action," standing 
alone, embraces Pelella's counterclaim for the purposes of section 
101 (a)(4)'s second proviso. "[T|he meaning of statutory language, plain or 
not depends on context." In the statutory context of section 101 (a)(4), the 
word "action is qualified by the phrase "to institute." 
A party institutes an action when he commences a judicial 
proceeding. A party commences a judicial proceeding when he takes the 
first step that invokes the judicial process. 
An action is therefore instituted when a plaintiff files a complaint as 
that constitutes the first step invoking the judicial process. In sharp 
contrast, a defendant asserts a counterclaim in response to a plaintiffs 
institution of an action. A counterclaim, by definition, is a "claim for relief 
asserted against an opposing party after an original claim has been made." 
Counterclaims are therefore "generally asserted in the answer" to a 
previously filed complaint. 
In other words, a defendant does not "institute" an action when he 
asserts a counterclaim. Rather, a plaintiff must commence the action by 
filing a complaint that names a defendant. This affords the defendant the 
ability to file a responsive pleading, namely the answer, in which he can 
include a claim for relief against the opposing party. [Pelella, 350 F.3d at 
81-82 (citations deleted) (emphasis added)]. 
Similarly, the word "action" in Subsection (4)(a), that is at issue in this case, must 
be read in context, and it is qualified by that section's reference to service of a 
"complaint." See also e.g., Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, % 17, 66 P.3d 592 (noting rule 
of statutory construction requiring court to look to "the plain language of the statute as a 
whole") (emphasis added); Sorenson 's Ranch School v. Oram, 2001 UT App 354, J^ 11, 
36 P.3d 528 (noting if the Legislature had intended a broader application of statute, it 
would not have added language that qualified and limited statute's reach). Pelella 
upholds the proposition, which governs in this case, that the express statutory language 
must be followed. It also confirms that a counterclaim is properly considered as 
something "in sharp contrast" from a "complaint." Subsection 4(a) does not apply to this 
case in which Hart did not file this "action" nor serve a "complaint," and this Court 
should reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion which misinterpreted Subsection 4(a). 
C. Stretching the Statutory Term "Complaint" to Include Hart's 
Counterclaim Creates Confusion and a Trap 
The Court of Appeals in this case ultimately concluded that "the term 'complaint,' 
as it is used in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), includes counterclaims" because "a literal reading 
of the term 'complaint' would be 'unreasonably confusing]' and render the statute 
'inoperable.'" Sill v. Hart, 128 P.3d 1215, 1219, \ 13 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (Court of 
Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 hereto). The Court of Appeals failed, however, to 
provide any explanation as to how a literal reading of the statutory term "complaint" 
(which is the required reading of statutory terms according to established rules of 
statutory construction discussed in Part LA. above) would be in any way confusing or 
render Subsection 4(a) inoperable. To the contrary, Subsection 4(a) is clear and entirely 
operable with a plain language interpretation of its exclusive application to a "complaint" 
served on the owner. It is instead the Court of Appeals' Opinion which creates confusion 
by, for the first time, straying from the express language of Subsection 4(a) and applying 
it to pleadings other than a "complaint." That ruling and departure from the statutory 
language and rules of judicial construction leaves parties not knowing in advance of the 
ruling what a statute means and requires, based upon its plain facial language. It leaves 
parties having to guess at their peril whether the statute will be applied to other situations 
beyond what is described by the clear statutory language itself, and therefore unable to 
govern their conduct with any assurity as to whether something more will later be 
deemed to be required of them beyond what appears on the face of the statute. Hart in 
particular had no way to know, including having no prior judicial guidance, that the term 
"complaint" in Subsection 4(a) would be deemed to apply to his Counterclaim in this 
case. See e.g., Gillman v. Sprint Comrn. Co., L.P., 2004 UT App 143,1j 7, 91 P.3d 858 
("It is the plain meaning of a statute that provides notice of its applications, and thus, 
unless the plain meaning is ambiguous or fails to make sense of the statute as a whole, we 
do not look beyond the text.") 
Any interpretation of Subsection 4(a) that would broaden its application beyond 
cases in which the lienholder itself first files the action and serves a "complaint" on the 
homeowner renders the Legislature's careful wording inoperative and meaningless. 
Since Subsection 4(a) on its face applies only when a lienholder first files an action and 
serves the homeowner with a "complaint," and since neither of those occurred in this 
case, Subsection 4(a) does not apply to Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure Counterclaim. 
The Court of Appeals erred in stretching the term "complaint" to include a Counterclaim 
like Hart's.4 This Court should therefore reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion. 
4
 The Court of Appeals also based its Opinion that Subsection 4(a) applies to 
counterclaims in part on its determination that "the term 'if,' which triggers the statute, 
modifies only the language in the first clause of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) and not the word 
'complaint,' which appears in the second clause." Sill v. Hart. 128 P.3d 1215, 1218, ^ J 9 
(Utah Ct. App. 2005) (Court of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 hereto). As shown 
in the main text above, however, on its face Subsection 4(a) expressly applies only where 
a "complaint" is served, regardless of whether, grammatically, the " i f in Subsection 4(a) 
modifies "complaint." Additionally, the Court of Appeals' analysis on the scope of the 
effect of the word " i f in Subsection 4(a) misconstrues the language of the statute 
because there simply are no separate clauses within Subsection 4(a). Rather, it contains 
one single-clause sentence with a set of commas that merely set off the definition of a 
"residence" as that term is used in Subsection 4(a). There is no shift in subject, topic, or 
thought after the commas that set off the citation to the other statutory definition section. 
The material before those commas and after them therefore are not separate clauses. 
Accordingly, the entire introductory sentence of Subsection 4(a), including the word 
"complaint," all is modified, qualified, and limited by the " i f that begins 
II. SUBSECTION 4(a) DOES NOT REQUIRE SERVICE OF THE 
REFERENCED INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMS WHERE THEY 
ADMITTEDLY PROVIDED SILL NO RIGHT OR REMEDY AGAINST 
HART 
A. There Was Nothing to Serve Upon Sill on the Face of Subsection 4(a) 
Sill was not entitled to receive from Hart the instructions and forms referenced in 
Subsection 4(a) even apart from Hart never having filed or served the statutorily-required 
"complaint." It is well-established that when interpreting a statute the Court should look 
to "the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony 
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 
12 f 17, 66 P.3d 592 (emphasis added). It is highly significant to this case that 
Subsection 4(a) expressly states that what is to be included "with the service of the 
complaint on the owner of the residence" is: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the ownerfs rights 
under Title 38, Chapter 11„ Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery 
Fund Act [identified and referred to above, and hereinafter, as the 
"LRFA"]; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner 
of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner may exercise 
available rights under Tthe LRFA1. [(Utah Code § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) 
(emphasis added)]. 
Sill indisputably and admittedly did not have any rights under the LRFA as against 
Hart. There was therefore nothing required to be served upon Sill on the face of 
Subsection 4(a). 
Subsection 4(a). Subsection 4(a) therefore applies only "if' the lien claimant "files an 
action" and specifically serves a "complaint on the owner" (emphasis added). 
The LRFA is a statute which protects homeowners from having to pay twice for 
the same improvements made to their home. It does so by providing that once a 
homeowner has paid its general contractor in full the homeowner and the home are then 
free from claims and liens of subcontractors who worked on the home. See e.g., Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-11-102(14) (2001) (defining "original contractor" as "a person who 
contracts with the owner of real property"); id., § 38-11-107(1) (providing homeowners 
relief only against parties with contracts "other than directly with the owner"); id. § 38-
1 l-204(3)(b) (providing homeowners relief oniy after the homeowner "has paid in full 
the original contractor"). In such cases, the LRFA instructions and forms referenced in 
Subsection 4(a) provide a mechanism for the homeowner to quickly and easily, without 
having to incur the expense of retaining counsel,5 complete the forms to swear and certify 
to the court that he has already paid in full the original or general contractor for the 
improvements and therefore obtain summary judgment requiring removal of the lien of a 
subcontractor. 
The LRFA does not apply to and has no bearing or effect whatsoever on the liens 
and claims of original or general contractors, and certainly not general contractors whom 
the homeowner has not paid in full. Sill himself correctly admits, and the Court of 
Appeals acknowledged, that Hart was an original, general contractor, with whom Sill 
contracted directly. Sill indisputably did not pay Hart in full (as evidenced most 
poignantly by the jury awarding Hart judgment against Sill in the full principal amount of 
5
 There is simply no need for such instructions or forms where the homeowner himself, 
Sill in this case, is the one who initiated the lawsuit and had already retained an attorney. 
the $314,500 claimed by Hart for the improvements made to Sill's property). Since 
Subsection 4(a) calls for service only of forms relating to "the owner's rights" and 
"available rights" under the LRFA, and since Sill indisputably and admittedly did not 
have any such rights as against Hart, there simply were no instructions or forms to be 
served upon Sill under the plain language of Subsection 4(a). 
B. The Law Does Not Require Performance of a Useless Act 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion improperly imposed a requirement to serve 
admittedly inapplicable LRFA instructions and forms that would have been of no use to 
Sill, and which could not have made any difference whatsoever to the outcome of this 
case. Even if he had received LRFA instructions and forms, Sill had no rights under the 
LRFA and would not have been able to make any use of them. Service of those 
instructions and forms would not and could not have changed one bit what Sill did in this 
case or what the outcome was. Service of such forms therefore would have been a 
completely vain and useless act, which the law does not require. See e.g., Carr v. Enoch 
Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating the law does not require 
one to do a vain or useless thing); Leger Const., Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212, 214 
(Utah 1976) (same); accord e.g., Defee v. Kaley, 167 S.E.2d 758, 759 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1969) (sustaining oral motion to dismiss even though statute required motion to be in 
writing and served on adverse party, since the case still would properly have been 
dismissed if written motion had been made, noting the law does not require one "to do 
that which would be fruitless"); Cichecki v. City of Hamtramack Police Dep't, 170 
N.W.2d 58, 61 (Mich. 1969) (holding parties did not have to make a demand required 
under statute, because making such demand would have been "futile," and the "law does 
not require a party to perform a useless act"). 
In footnote 3 of its Opinion the Court of Appeals stated that "the responsibility of 
determining whether the owner being sued has rights under the [LRFA] does not belong 
to the lien claimant." Sill v. Hart, 128 P.3d 1215, 1218, f 9 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (Court 
of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 hereto). That claim, however, ignores the plain 
language of Subsection 4(a) and the admitted facts of this case. Subsection 4(a) 
expressly requires service (only with a "complaint" to foreclose a mechanics' lien upon a 
residence) only of instructions and forms "relating to the owner's rights" and "upon 
which the owner may exercise available rights" under the LRFA. Utah Code Ann. §§38-
1-1 l(4)(a)(i) & (ii). Just like it is the responsibility of the lien claimant to determine 
whether the property at issue is a residence as defined in and subject to the LRFA, so too 
is it the responsibility of the lien claimant to determine whether the owner of a residence 
has rights under the LRFA on the facts of the situation at issue -just the same as it is the 
lien claimant's responsibility to determine whether it may properly take any steps under 
the mechanics' lien act. 
In an appropriate case a court may later find that a subcontractor made an incorrect 
determination and is barred by Subsection 4(a) for failing to serve an owner with LRFA 
instructions and forms to which they are entitled. This case, however, is not such a case. 
Here, it is admitted by Sill, and otherwise indisputable, that Sill had no rights under the 
LRFA as against his unpaid general contractor, Hart. In light of such admitted and 
indisputable facts, and further in light of the plain language appearing in Subsection 4(a) 
requiring service of LRFA instructions and forms only where the owner has rights under 
the LRFA, this Court should uphold that Subsection 4(a) does not apply to this case and 
does not require the meaningless act of service of LRFA instructions and forms that are 
inapplicable and useless to Sill as against Hart. The Court should not punish Hart, as the 
Court of Appeals did, for not providing something that he had no duty to provide on the 
face of Subsection 4(a). 
C. The Court of Appeals' Opinion is At Odds with Legislative History and 
Intent 
The legislative history of Subsection 4(a) confirms that it does not apply to this 
case because of Sill's acknowledged lack of rights under the LRFA. The legislative 
history of Subsection 4(a), both at the time it was originally adopted in 2001, and when it 
was later amended in 2004, confirms it is only subcontractors whose liens and other 
collection rights are affected by the LRFA that is referenced in Subsection 4(a). 
Accordingly, it is only subcontractors who the Legislature intended be required by 
Subsection 4(a) to provide the LRFA instructions and forms. 
The Senate committee hearings and the Senate floor debates on the proposed 
addition of the requirement to serve LRFA instructions and forms when Subsection (4)(a) 
was first adopted in 2001 both confirm that the requirement does not apply to cases like 
this one in which a general contractor is seeking payment in the first instance from the 
homeowner for services provided by the general contractor. See e.g., S.B. 254, 1st 
Substitution, 2001 Gen. Leg. Sess., Senate Business, Labor and Economic Development 
Standing Committee Meeting held 02/16/01 (discussing the proposed Subsection 4(a), 
explaining the LRFA referenced therein is designed to provide protection against 
subcontractors when a homeowner has already paid in full the general contractor for the 
project who then fails to pay subcontractors); S.B. 254, 1st Substitution, 2001 Gen. Leg. 
Sess., Senate Floor Debate held 02/20/01 (stating the LRFA is aimed at "the situation of 
the innocent homeowner who pays [his general contractor] for the house, and then ... has 
to pay for his house a second time" to remove a lien of a subcontractor whom the general 
contractor failed to pay). 
Likewise, when Subsection (4)(a) was amended in 2004 (to require service of 
only the instructions and form affidavit, deleting the requirement to serve a form 
summary judgment motion - see Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4) (2004)), the Senate 
committee hearings and floor debates both again reiterated that the requirement to serve 
any of those forms under Subsection 4(a) only applies to subcontractors and suppliers 
who are not in direct privity of contract with the homeowner, and not to general 
contractors. See e.g., H.B. 32, H.B. 62, H.B. 182, 2004 Gen. Leg. Sess., Senate Business 
and Labor Standing Committee Meeting held 01/30/04 (discussing the proposed 
amendment to Subsection 4(a) and noting "the primary focus [of the LRFA that is 
referenced in Subsection (4)(a)] was designed to protect homeowners who deal with the 
general contractor, and pay the general contractor in full, from having liens filed against 
their property [by subcontractors] so that they would have to pay twice."); H.B. 32, H.B. 
62, H.B. 182, 2004 Gen. Leg. Sess., Senate Floor Debate held 02/04/04 (noting the LRFA 
was designed "to take care of the suppliers that couldn't get the money from the [general] 
contractor" whom the homeowner had paid in full). 
When interpreting a statute, the "primary goal is to give effect to the Legislature's 
intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State v. Perez, 2000 UT 
App 65, H 6, 999 P.2d 579 (quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 117, 194 (Utah 1998) 
(internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted)). In order to give effect to the 
Legislature's intent with respect to Subsection 4(a), a general contractor must not be held 
to a requirement, as the Court of Appeals imposed in this case, to serve with a 
counterclaim inapplicable and useless instructions and forms upon a homeowner who has 
sued him. This Court therefore should reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion which is 
contrary to the Legislature's intent as shown in both the language of Subsection 4(a) and 
its legislative history. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS5 OPINION DEPARTS FROM AND 
UNDERMINES THE LONG-RECOGNIZED PURPOSES AND 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTES 
It has been long and repeatedly recognized that the intent and purpose of Utah's 
mechanics' lien statutes, of which Subsection 4(a) is a part, "manifestly has been to 
protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor and furnish the materials which enter 
into the construction of a building or other improvement." John Wagner Assoc, v. 
Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Utah courts further have held 
that to effect that purpose, the mechanics' lien statutes are to be construed liberally in 
favor of parties who, like Hart in this case, improve real property. Butter field Lumbery 
Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage. Corp., 815 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This Court 
also has noted and followed the "modern trend" in mechanics' lien cases "to dispense 
with arbitrary rules which have no demonstrable value in a particular fact situation." 
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 
1990) (upholding lien against attack where claimed deficiencies did not prejudice other 
party) (emphasis added). 
The district court's Decision that Subsection 4(a) is inapplicable to this case is 
firmly rooted in the express language of Subsection 4(a) specifically. It also is in 
harmony with and serves the intended purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes generally 
of protecting Hart who substantially improved Sill's property. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion, by contrast, contorts the plain language of 
Subsection 4(a) and extends it to facts and circumstances to which on its face it clearly 
does not apply {i.e., the Counterclaim of an unpaid general contractor), including despite 
the indisputable and admitted fact that the LRFA instructions and forms had no value 
whatsoever to Sill as against Hart and could not have changed the outcome of this case. 
All of this is, contrary to the purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes, to the detriment of, 
and indeed as an impediment to recovery by, Hart whom the jury found substantially 
improved Sill's Property. The result is an enormous windfall to Sill, allowing him to 
delay for several years payment for his luxury home built by Hart without having to pay 
interest in the meantime on the money owed by Sill, nor the attorney fees and costs that 
Hart was required to expend in order to obtain and collect a judgment against Sill for the 
amount he justly owed. This Court has recognized that recovery of those amounts in 
addition to the principal amount owed is vitally important to the mechanics' lien system: 
The purpose of the mechanic's lien is to protect those whose labor or 
materials have enhanced the value of property. [The attorney fee provision 
of the mechanic's lien statutes] strengthens that protection by ensuring that 
someone who successfully uses a mechanic's lien to enforce a payment 
obligation for such enhancement will not ultimately bear the legal costs of 
that enforcement action. It also functions as a penalty for one who wrongly 
fails to pay for enhancement to his property. [A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing 
and Heating v. Guy, supra, 2004 UT 47, f 24, 94 P.3d 270, 276; see also 
e.g., Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1998) 
(stating general rule that unpaid mechanic is entitled to interest from when 
the last materials furnished)]. 
The courts should not award such windfalls to delinquent property owners like Sill 
at the expense of contractors like Hart by novel interpretations of mechanics' lien 
statutory provisions that apply them beyond their plain and ordinary meaning, and by 
requiring actions from unpaid contractors that admittedly are of no use or benefit at all to 
homeowners. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals' extension of Subsection 4(a) to the facts of this case is 
contrary to the plain language of the statute and established rules of statutory 
construction. It also punishes Hart for not providing to Sill instructions and forms that 
admittedly did not apply to this case and could not have changed its outcome. The Court 
of Appeals' Opinion improperly barred Hart from recovery of substantial attorney fees 
incurred to force payment of, and prejudgment interest accruing for years on, the amount 
justly owed by Sill. This Court should reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion, and 
uphold the Decision of the district court in this case, that Subsection 4(a) is inapplicable 
to this case and that Hart is entitled to the attorney fees and prejudgment interest awarded 
to him for his successful prosecution of his mechanics' lien. 
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SILL v. 
Cite as 128 P.3d 121 
1112 In holding that the defendant in Von 
Murdoch was not an Indian, the 10th Circuit 
court asserted jurisdiction and affirmed the 
conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1165, 
which prohibits hunting on land belonging to 
an Indian tribe without permission. See Von 
Murdoch, 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir.1997). 
Likewise, in Felter, the court found that be-
cause the defendant no longer maintained 
Indian status, the federal court could assert 
jurisdiction rather than the tribal court. See 
Felter, 752 F.2d 1505. The Felter court not-
ed "that 18 U.S.C. § 1165 is not applicable to 
tribal members who hunted in violation of 
tribal regulation. Tribal jurisdiction over 
such minor offenses remains exclusive." Id. 
at 1512 n. 11 (quoting Felter, 546 F.Supp. at 
1026). It remains clear, however, that "Indi-
an tribes lack jurisdiction to try and punish 
non-Indians for criminal offenses, and [thus,] 
18 U.S.C. § 1165 was designed to fill the gap 
in enforcement powers as to non-Indians 
hunting or fishing on tribal or other Indians 
lands without tribal permission." Id. The 
Felter court thus reasoned that an Indian 
hunting on Indian lands is under tribal juris-
diction, but a non-Indian hunting on Indian 
lands is under federal jurisdiction. Nothing 
in Von Murdoch or Felter suggests that state 
courts can ever assert jurisdiction over hunt-
ing violations committed on Indian lands. 
CONCLUSION 
1113 We conclude that the crimes occurred 
in Indian Country governed by the Ute 
Tribe. Because the Ute Tribe is the victim, 
the State does not have jurisdiction. We 
therefore vacate the convictions. 
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Joel SILL, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Bill HART dba Hart Construction, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 20050245-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 15, 2005. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 5, 2005. 
Background: Property owner brought ac-
tion against contractor alleging breach of 
contract and other claims, and contractor 
filed counterclaims seeking to foreclose a 
mechanics' lien and for unjust enrichment. 
The Third District Court, Silver Summit 
Department, Deno Himonas, J., entered 
judgment on a jury verdict in favor of 
contractor, and awarded prejudgment in-
terest, attorney fees, and court costs on 
the mechanics' lien claim. Owner appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Davis, 
J., held that: 
(1) contractor was required to serve owner 
with certain documents in connection 
with the lien foreclosure counterclaim, 
but 
(2) contractor's failure to serve such docu-
ments did not deprive trial court of 
jurisdiction over counterclaim. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1114 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS 
and GREGORY K. ORME, Judges. 
E KEY NUMBER SYSTEM V 
the tribe." Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-211 (2003). 
Similarly, pursuant to its jurisdiction over the 
land, the Ute Tribe claims a property interest in 
the wildlife. Section 8-1-3(1) of the Ute Law 
and Order Code states: 
All wildlife now or hereafter within the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation, not held by private 
ownership legally acquired, and which for pur-
1. Appeal and Error @=>842(8) 
Questions of statutory interpretation are 
questions of law that are reviewed for cor-
rectness, giving no deference to the district 
court's interpretation. 
poses of this Code shall include all big game 
animals . . . are hereby declared to be the 
property of the Ute Indian Tribe. 
Ute Law and Order Code § 8-1-3(1); cf. Utah 
Code Ann. § 23-13-3 (2003) ("All wildlife exist-
ing within this state, not held by ownership and 
legally acquired, is the property of the state.")-
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2. Appeal and Error <®=>842(1) 
The determination of whether a trial 
court has subject matter jurisdiction is a 
question of law, which Court of Appeals re-
views for correctness, according no deference 
to the trial court's determination. 
3. Mechanics' Liens <s=*265 
Contractor who was sued by owner for 
breach of contract and on other claims, and 
who filed counterclaim seeking to enforce a 
mechanics' lien against owner's residence, 
was required to serve owner with a form 
affidavit and motion for summary judgment 
and instructions relating to the owner's stat-
utory rights, pursuant to statute requiring a 
mechanics' lien claimant to include such doc-
uments "with the service of the complaint" if 
the claimant "files an action to enforce" the 
lien; filing of counterclaim was the filing of 
an action to enforce the lien, and counter-
claim constituted a "complaint" within the 
meaning of the statute. West's U.C.A. § 38-
l-ll(4)(a). 
4. Pleading ®=>34(1) 
The character of a pleading will be de-
termined by the court by the facts set out in 
the pleading. 
5. Mechanics' Liens <s>265 
Contractor's failure to serve property 
owner with a form affidavit and motion for 
summary judgment and instructions relating 
to the owner's statutory rights, as required 
by statute governing actions to enforce me-
chanics' liens against residences, did not de-
prive trial court of jurisdiction over contrac-
tor's counterclaim seeking to foreclose a 
mechanics' lien against owner's residence, 
which was filed in owner's action alleging 
breach of contract and other claims; rather, 
contractor's failure to comply with statute 
was an avoidance or affirmative defense 
raising matters outside the pleadings. 
West's U.C.A. § 38-l-ll(4)(a); Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 8(c). 
David B. Thompson, Miller, Vance & 
Thompson, PC, Park City, for Appellant. 
Robert J. Dale, P. Bruce Badger, and 
Bradley L. Tilt, Fabian & Clendenin, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges DAVIS, GREENWOOD, 
and THORNE. 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Judge: 
111 Plaintiff-counterclaim defendant Joel 
Sill appeals from a final judgment and award 
of prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and 
court costs in favor of Defendant-counter-
claimant Bill Hart. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
112 Sill is the owner of real property locat-
ed in Summit County, Utah (the Property). 
Hart, a general contractor, began construc-
tion on the Property in the summer of 1999 
and continued until approximately December 
2001, at which time Hart left the job over a 
dispute with Sill regarding the completion of 
the project. In January 2002, Sill brought 
an action against Hart, alleging (1) breach of 
contract, (2) breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, (3) breach of fiduciary 
duty, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) in-
tentional misrepresentation, (6) unjust en-
richment, and (7) defamation. Hart counter-
claimed in February 2002, alleging breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment, and seeking 
to foreclose a mechanics' lien on the Proper-
ty. 
113 More than two and a half years later, 
in October 2004, Sill for the first time raised 
the issue of Hart's compliance with Utah 
Code section 38-l-Ll(4)(a). See Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) (2001). The parties re-
served the issue for post verdict determina-
tion, and the case went to trial one week 
later. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Hart in the amount of $314,500 on Hart's 
unjust enrichment and mechanics' lien 
claims. In addition, Hart was awarded pre-
judgment interest, attorney fees, and court 
costs on his mechanics' lien claim. 
114 Hart thereafter sought to reduce the 
verdict to judgment. Sill opposed the effort 
insofar as it related to Hart's mechanics' lien 
claim. Sill argued that the trial court lacked 
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jurisdiction to hear Hart's mechanics' lien 
claim because Hart, when he served his coun-
terclaim on Sill, did not include the instruc-
tions nor the form affidavit and motion for 
summary judgment required by section 38-
l-ll(4)(a).1 Hart disagreed, arguing that 
only plaintiffs filing a "complaint"—as op-
posed to those filing a counterclaim—are re-
quired to comply with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). 
The trial court agreed with Hart and entered 
judgment in his favor on both the unjust 
enrichment and the mechanics' lien claims. 
The court also awarded Hart prejudgment 
interest, attorney fees, and court costs on his 
mechanics' lien claim. Sill timely appealed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
H5 Under section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), a lien 
claimant filing an action to enforce a mechan-
ics' lien on a residence must include certain 
documents relating to the Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act 
when he serves his complaint upon the owner 
of the residence. See id. Pursuant to sec-
tion 38-1-1 l(4)(e), the lien claimant is 
"barred from maintaining or enforcing the 
lien" if he fails to provide such documents. 
Id. § 38-l-ll(4)(e). 
1} 6 Hart concedes that he did not serve Sill 
with the documents referenced in section 38-
l-ll(4)(a), but argues that section 38-1-
ll(4)(a) does not apply to his claim because 
he filed a counterclaim as opposed to a "com-
plaint" and because Sill has no rights under 
the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Re-
covery Fund Act. Sill, on the other hand, 
argues not only that section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) is 
applicable, but also that the language of sec-
tion 38-1-1 l(4)(e) makes subsection 4(a) a 
jurisdictional provision. Sill therefore con-
tends that Hart's failure to comply with sec-
tion 38-1-1 l(4)(a) deprived the trial court of 
jurisdiction to hear Hart's lien foreclosure 
action. 
1. In 2004, the legislature amended the statute to 
require service of only the instructions and form 
affidavit. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) 
(Supp.2004). However, the statute relevant to 
these proceedings required service of instruc-
tions and a form affidavit and motion for sum-
mary judgment. See id. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001). 
[1,2] 117 Questions of statutory interpre-
tation are questions of law that are reviewed 
"for correctness, giving no deference to the 
district court's interpretation." Board of 
Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37,118, 
94 P.3d 234. "The determination of whether 
a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a 
question of law, which we review for correct-
ness, according no deference to the [trial] 
court's determination." Beaver County v. 
Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,18, 31 P.3d 1147. 
ANALYSIS 
[3] H 8 Prior to addressing Sill's jurisdic-
tional claim, we first determine whether sec-
tion 38-1-1 l(4)(a) is even applicable in this 
case. The language at issue here states: 
If a lien claimant files an action to enforce 
a lien filed under [the Mechanics' Liens 
Act] involving a residence, as defined in 
[s]ection 38-ll-102,[2] the lien claimant 
shall include with the service of the com-
plaint on the owner of the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the resi-
dence relating to the owner's rights under 
Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Re-
striction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; 
and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for sum-
mary judgment to enable the owner of the 
residence to specify the grounds upon 
which the owner may exercise available 
rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Resi-
dence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery 
Fund Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a)(i)-(ii). Hart 
argues the statute applies only if the lien 
claimant "files an action" and serves a "com-
plaint" to foreclose a mechanics' lien, and 
only if the owner being sued has rights under 
the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Re-
covery Fund Act. Hart therefore contends 
that he was not required to serve the docu-
ments referenced in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) be-
2. Under Utah Code section 38-11-102, a "resi-
dence" is defined as "an improvement to real 
property used or occupied, to be used or occu-
pied as, or in conjunction with, a primary or 
secondary detached single-family dwelling or 
multifamily dwelling up to two units, including 
factory built housing." Utah Code Ann. § 38-
11-102(20) (2001). 
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cause he filed a counterclaim, as opposed to 
an initial complaint, to foreclose a mechanics' 
lien and because Sill has no rights under the 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recov-
ery Fund Act. 
U9 We disagree with Hart's contention 
that section 38-l-ll(4)(a) requires the ser-
vice of a "complaint" and applies only if the 
owner being sued has rights under the Resi-
dence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery 
Fund Act. "When faced with a question of 
statutory construction, we look first to the 
plain language of the statute," Gillman v. 
Sprint Communications Co., 2004 UT App 
143,11 7, 91 P.3d 858 (quotations and citation 
omitted), cert, denied, 98 P.3d 1177 (Utah 
2004), and we "will not infer substantive 
terms into the text that are not already 
there," Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board 
of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112,1130, 38 
P.3d 291 (quotations and citation omitted). 
The statute here is triggered "[i]f a lien 
claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed 
under [the Mechanics' Liens Act] involving a 
residence, as defined in [s]ection 38-11-102." 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a). By the 
plain language of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), the 
term "if," which triggers the statute, modifies 
only the language in the first clause of sec-
tion 38-1-1 l(4)(a) and not the word "com-
plaint," which appears in the second clause. 
See id. The application of section 38-1-
ll(4)(a), therefore, does not require the ser-
vice specifically of a complaint, nor is the 
statute applicable only if the owner being 
sued has rights under the Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act.3 
Instead, the statute is triggered if a lien 
claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed 
under the Mechanics' Liens Act involving a 
residence as defined by section 38-11-102. 
See id. 
U 10 Section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) was clearly trig-
gered here. Pursuant to the Mechanics' 
Liens Act, Hart recorded a notice of lien with 
Summit County in January 2002, and neither 
party argues that such lien does not involve a 
residence as defined by section 38-11-102. 
See id. § 38-11-102(20) (2001). Further-
3. Furthermore, the responsibility of determining 
whether the owner being sued has rights under 
the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recov-
more, Hart filed an action to enforce the lien 
when he filed his counterclaim in February 
2002. The fact that Sill had already filed a 
complaint against Hart—alleging seven 
causes of action, all of which sounded in 
common law and none of which were related 
to the Mechanics' Liens Act—does not affect 
Hart's role as "a lien claimant filfing] an 
action to enforce a lien filed under [the Me-
chanics' Liens Act] involving a residence, as 
defined in [s]ection 38-11-102." Id. § 38-1-
ll(4)(a). Hart therefore was required to 
serve upon Sill the instructions and form 
affidavit and motion for summary judgment 
referenced in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). 
1111 Our interpretation of section 38-1-
ll(4)(a) is supported by Utah caselaw. 
When interpreting the plain language of a 
statute, we "assume that each term in the 
statute was used advisedly; thus the statuto-
ry words are read literally, unless such a 
reading is unreasonably confused or inopera-
ble." Gillman, 2004 UT App 143 at U 7, 91 
P.3d 858 (quotations and citation omitted). 
"It is axiomatic that a statute should be given 
a reasonable and sensible construction, and 
that the legislature did not intend an absurd 
or unreasonable result." State ex rel. Div. of 
Consumer Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 
313 (Utah 1988) (internal citation omitted). 
1112 Here, the statute at issue applies to a 
lien claimant filing "an action to enforce a 
lien filed under [the Mechanics' Liens Act]." 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a). Utah 
courts have interpreted similar language to 
include counterclaims. See, e.g., American 
Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communica-
tion Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 193 (Utah Ct.App. 
1997) ("[Defendant] brought a counterclaim 
to foreclose its mechanics' liens. This clearly 
qualifies as *an[y] action brought to enforce 
any lien' under the mechanics' lien statute." 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (Supp. 
1996))); First Gen. Servs. v. Perkins, 918 
P.2d 480, 486 (Utah Ct.App.1996) ("[T]he suc-
cessful defense of counterclaims which would 
otherwise defeat the principal lien claim . . . 
must necessarily be considered for the pur-
pose of awarding attorney fees under [section 
ery Fund Act does not belong to the lien claim-
ant. 
SILL v. 
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38-1-18 of] the mechanics' lien statute. Log-
ically, a lien holder must defend against such 
claims in order to 'enforce' the lien." (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1994))). 
[4] 1113 Furthermore, although the stat-
ute specifically references "the service of the 
complaint," Utah Code. Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a), 
the term "complaint" is frequently interpret-
ed in Utah caselaw as including counter-
claims, see, e.g., State ex rel. Road Comm'n 
v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585, 587 
(1962) ("[N]either under our rules or else-
where, can a counterclaimant cast himself in 
any other role than that of a plaintiff."), 
overruled in part on other grounds, Colman 
v. State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); 
Harman v. Yeager, 103 Utah 208, 134 P.2d 
695, 696 (1943) ("A counterclaim is viewed as 
an original action, instituted by the defen-
dant against the plaintiff and is tested by the 
same tests and rules as a complaint."). In-
deed, the character of a pleading "will be 
determined by the court by the facts set out 
in the pleading." Harman, 134 P.2d at 696; 
see also For-Shor Co. v. Early, 828 P.2d 
1080, 1084 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (treating 
an action to intervene and foreclose a lien as 
a complaint). Because a literal reading of 
the term "complaint" would be "unreasonably 
confusfing]" and render the statute "inopera-
ble," Gillman, 2004 UT App 143 at 11 7, 91 
P.3d 858 (quotations and citation omitted), 
we hold that the term "complaint," as it is 
used in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), includes coun-
terclaims. 
[5] 1114 Sill argues that section 38-1-
ll(4)(a) is a jurisdictional provision, and 
therefore, Hart's failure to comply therewith 
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear 
Hart's lien foreclosure action. We recently 
ruled that "failure to adhere to section 38-1-
ll(4)(a) [does] not divest the trial court of 
jurisdiction." Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT 
App 383,1115,121 P.3d 717. 
1115 Instead, Hart's failure to comply with 
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) "constitutes] an avoid-
ance or affirmative defense" under rule 8(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 8(c). Although rule 8(c) does not 
define or explain what constitutes an avoid-
ance or an affirmative defense, "a rule 8(c) 
affirmative defense is a defense employed to 
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defeat the plaintiffs claim by raising matters 
outside or extrinsic to the plaintiffs prima 
facie case." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2002 UT 68,1131, 56 P.3d 524; see also 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. 
Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366,1374 (Utah 1996) ("A 
rule 8(c) affirmative defense . . . raises mat-
ter outside the plaintiffs prima facie case." 
(quotations and citation omitted)); Creekview 
Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d 
693, 695 (Utah CtApp.1989) (explaining that 
avoidance under rule 8(c) is "a defense inde-
pendent of the allegations in the pleadings"). 
Here, Hart's failure to comply with the re-
quirements of section 38-l-ll(4)(a) consti-
tutes an affirmative defense by Sill, in that it 
suggests that Hart's mechanics' lien claim is 
invalid for reasons outside and independent 
of the allegations in Hart's counterclaim. 
U 16 Although it appears from the record 
that Sill did not raise the affirmative defense 
until one week prior to trial and never made 
a motion to amend his prior pleadings to 
include the affirmative defense, the trial 
court made no findings whatsoever regarding 
these matters, the effect thereof, or the ef-
fect of the parties' stipulation thereon. Fur-
ther, it is unclear from the record whether 
Hart ever served Sill with the instructions 
and form affidavit and motion for summary 
judgment required by section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). 
CONCLUSION 
1117 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse 
the trial court's award of prejudgment inter-
est, attorney fees, and court costs in favor of 
Hart, and remand for further proceedings 
regarding Sill's affirmative defense in accor-
dance with this opinion. The parties are to 
bear their own attorney fees and court costs 
on appeal. 
1118 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD and WILLIAM A. 
THORNE JR., Judges. 
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ORDER 
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Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for 
rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 
FOR THEICOURT: 
day of J a n u a r y , 2006 
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vs. 
BILL HART, d/b/a HART 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KALLIE J. SILL and DOES I-X, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No, 020500012 
Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
From October 13-22, 2004, Defendant and Counterclaimant, Bill Hart d/b/a Bill Hart 
Construction ("Hart"), and Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, Joel Sill ("Sill"), tried this matter 
to a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in Hart's favor of $314,500.00 
on his unjust enrichment and mechanics.' lien claims. 
Hart now seeks to reduce the verdict to a judgment. To this end, Hart has filed a Motion for 
Entry of Judgment Upon a Verdict and for Decree of Foreclosure, Award of Prejudgment Interest, 
Attorney's Fees and Costs (the "Motion"). Sill opposes the Motion on the grounds that (1) "Hart's 
lien action is barred" because "Hart failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) 
when he served his counterclaim complaint on Sill;"1 (2) Hart is not entitled to prejudgment interest 
and attorney's fees on his unjust enrichment claim; and (3) "Hart is entitled to only a portion of the 
costs he claims." Response to Motion, pp. 3 & 8. For the reasons set forth below, the Court is of 
the view that Hart's lien claim is valid and that he is entitled to prejudgment interest and attorney's 
fees as a result. The Court is also of the view that Hart is entitled to a large part of his costs. 
]By stipulation the parties reserved for "post-verdict determination . . . [a]ny issues concerning 
Hart's compliance with the statutory requirements for maintaining and enforcing a mechanic's lien." 
Response to Motion for Entry of Judgment Upon Verdict and for Decree of Foreclosure, Award of 
Prejudgment Interest, Attorney's Fees and Costs ("Response to Motion"), p. 2 (citation and internal 
quotations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
Sill concedes that Hart is entitled to a judgment of $314,500.00 "for his unjust enrichment 
claim." Response to Motion, p. 2. He contests, however, Hart's entitlement to a judgment on his 
mechanics' lien claim. The nub of Sill's argument is that when Hart filed his counterclaim, he failed 
to comply with the notice requirements set forth in Section 11(4) of Utah's mechanics' lien statute 
(Title 38, Chapter 1), which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(4)(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under 
this chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, 
the lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on 
the owner of the residence: (i) instructions to the owner of the 
residence relating to the owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and (ii) a 
form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner 
of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner may 
exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
(b) The lien claimant may file a notice to submit for decision on the 
motion for summary judgment. The motion may be ruled upon after 
the service of the summons and complaint upon the nonpaying party, 
as defined in Section 38-11 -102, and the time for the nonpaying party 
to respond,..., has elapsed. 
* * * 
(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the 
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien 
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon 
the residence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4) (2001)(emphasis added).2 Specifically, Sill argues that Hart never 
served him with the instructions and "form affidavit and motion for summary judgment" identified 
in Subsection (4)(a) when he filed his counterclaim. He further argues that this failure dooms Hart's 
request for prejudgment interest and attorney's fees because Hart is only entitled to the same if he 
prevails on his lien claim. 
Hart readily admits that he did not serve the papers referenced above on Sill. He also readily 
admits that he is not entitled to recover either prejudgment interest or attorney's fees on his unjust 
enrichment claim. See, e.g., Motion, pp. 8 & 10-13. But he vigorously disputes the notion that 
Subsection (4) applies to this dispute. 
2The parties are in agreement that the mechanics' lien statute in place when I fart filed his 
counterclaim (February 2002) governs this dispute. See, e.g., Response to Motion, p. 3 n.l. 
2 
Both parties acknowledge that Subsection (4) is essentially dispositive of this issue and, 
therefore, contend that the Subsection's plain and unambiguous language requires the Court to rule 
in their favor. According to Sill, Hart's filing of his counterclaim constituted "fil[ing] an action to 
enforce a lien" and triggered the notice obligations set forth in Subsection (4). Not so, according to 
Hart; Subsection (4) applies, he asserts, only if a lien claimant "files an action" and serves a 
"complaint" (versus a counterclaim) on a homeowner. Hart is correct. 
"[W]hen interpreting a statute," a court "looks first to the statute's plain language to 
determine" legislative intent. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, \ 17, 66 P.3d 592 (citation omitted). 
In doing so, it must "read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in 
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related statutes." Id. (citations omitted). And 
where the statute is clear, the court must not "assess the wisdom of the legislation," but must 
"implement the law as it reads unless it results in an absurd outcome." Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 
P.2d 577, 586 (Utah App. 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
The plain language of Subsection (4) compels the conclusion that the Utah"Legislature 
limited the obligation of a lien claimant to serve a homeowner with the materials referenced in 
Subsection (4)(a) to those instances in which the lien claimant was initiating an action through 
service of a complaint and not a counterclaim. First, while "[t]he word 'action' without more is 
arguably broad enough to encompass any type of judicial proceeding, including counterclaims" 
(Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers'Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73,81 (2nd Cir. 2003) (citations 
omitted)), read in the context of Subsection (4), it is qualified by the reference to "service of the 
complaint."3 Second, this reference to a complaint is to a pleading that is filed at the commencement 
of a lawsuit and that is commonly understood to be distinct from a counterclaim. See, e.g., Local 
Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d at 82; see also Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 3 ("A civil action is commenced (1) by filing of a complaint. . . , or (2) by service of a 
summons together with a copy of the complaint") & 7(a) (distinguishing a complaint from other 
pleadings). Third, had the Legislature intended Sill's construction, it could have easily provided for 
it (e.g., by substituting the words "initial pleading" for "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a)).4 
3Sill argues that the Utah Court of Appeals disposed of this issue in his favor in American Rural 
Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 185 (Utah App. 1997), when it held that the 
word "action" in Section 38-1-18 of the mechanics' lien statute included a counterclaim. Id., p. 193. 
Sill's reading ignores that there are no words or phrases in Section 18 that restrict the word "action" in 
any way. Indeed, the current statute references "any action." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). Sill also 
ignores that the American Rural Cellular decision is in harmony with the purpose of the mechanics' lien 
statute, while his suggested interpretation is not. Infra, pp. 4-5; American Rural Cell, 939 P.2d at 193. 
4Sill counters that the reference to a "summons and complaint" in Subsection (4)(b) is proof that 
the Legislature intended the reference to a "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) be broadly construed. Sill's 
conclusion just does not follow. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party may not move for 
summary judgment until "the expiration of 20 days from commencement of the action." Subsection 4(b) 
simply makes clear that the motion for summary judgment identified in Subsection (4)(a) is not subject to 
the same restraint. 
3 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' 
Int'l v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, is instructive. There, the Second Circuit was confronted with the 
question of whether the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA") barred an 
employee's counterclaim because it was financed by an "interested employer." Under Section 
101(a)(4) of the LMRDA, an employee could not "institute an action" that was financed by an 
"interested employer." Therefore, the union argued, Pelella could not maintain his employer-backed 
counterclaim. The Second Circuit, relying heavily on a decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, disagreed. In doing so it noted that: 
[A] defendant does not "institute" an action when he asserts a 
counterclaim. Rather, a plaintiff must commence the action by filing 
a complaint that names a defendant. This affords the defendant the 
ability to file a responsive pleading, namely the answer,..., in which 
he can include a claim for relief against the opposing party. 
Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7, 350 F.3d at 82. The Second Circuit further noted 
that this "narrow construction" better comported with legislative purpose, and that the "concerns" 
that Section 101(a)(4) "seeks to address" were lessened because, "P}]y taking the member to court, 
the union itself introduces the outside actor into what once had been an internal grievance and opens 
the door to some measure of interference." Id, pp. 84-85.5 
Sill counters that in Harmon v. Yeagar Et Ux., 134 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1943), the Utah 
Supreme Court wrote that "[a] counterclaim is viewed as an original action . . . tested by the same 
tests and rules as a complaint." He further counters that Black's Law Dictionary defines "complaint" 
to include a counterclaim.6 While these arguments are not without some persuasive value, they do 
not carry the day. Moreover, accepting these arguments would only create an ambiguity-an 
ambiguity that must be resolved in favor of Hart's construction. 
To the extent that a statute is ambiguous, it is appropriate for a court to look beyond its 
language and to its legislative history7 and purpose. See Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 
480, 482 (Utah 1980) (citation omitted); State v. Burgess-Benyon, 2004 UT App 312, f 7, 99 P.3d 
383 (citation omitted). With respect to the statute at hand, it is well established that its general 
purpose is "to provide protection to those who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor 
or materials." AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Development and Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289, 
5In a similar fashion, the concerns that Subsection (4) guards against are lessened when the 
homeowner has demonstrated a certain familiarity with the legal process by instituting suit against a lien 
claimant. 
6This is a secondary definition. The primary definition, at least according to Black's Law 
Dictionary, is "[t]he original or initial pleading by which an action is commenced." 
7Because neither party addressed the legislative history of Subsection (4), the Court assumes that 
it is either nonexistent or unhelpful. 
4 
291 (Utah 1986); see also Butter field Lumbar, Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Assoc, 815 P.2d 1330, 
1334 (Utah 1991).8 That purpose is served by construing Subsection (4) narrowly and consistent 
with its plain language, as Hart urges.9 
Finally, the Court rejects Sill's alternative challenge to Hart's entitlement to prejudgment 
interest and awards Hart the same on his mechanics' lien claim. The Court also awards Hart 
attorney's fees (as prayed for and established by affidavit) and costs of suit (as described by the 
Court at the January 31, 2005 hearing). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Motion in part and denies it in part. Counsel 
for Hart is to prepare, circulate, and submit a Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this _~L_frclay of February, 2005, in Summit County, State of Utah. 
BY THECOURT 
DENO G. HIIVTON^B
 r . . . 
DISTRICT COURT J U D G E ^ ^ ' 
8It is important to note that "[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is 
animated by one general purpose and intent." Miller, 2003 UT at Tf 17 (emphasis added) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). 
9Sill admits that he was not eligible for relief under the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act. Nevertheless, he urges the Court to adopt an interpretation that would restrict Hart's 
ability to recover for an otherwise valid lien based on Hart's failure to provide notice of an irrelevant 
statutory provision. While this point is certainly not dispositive, it does help emphasize that Sill's 
construction is contrary to the lien law's overarching purpose. 
5 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOEL SILL, 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, 
vs. 
BILL HART, d/b/a HART CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant, 
BILL HART, d/b/a HART CONSTRUCTION, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
KALLIE J. SILL, and DOES I-X, 
Third Party Defendants. 
FINAL JUDGMENT, ORDER AND 
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
Civil No. 020500012 
Judge Deno G. Himonas 
The Jury having rendered its verdict in this action on October 22, 2004, and the court 
having flilly considered Defendant, Counterclaimant and Third Party Plaintiff Bill Hart's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment Upon a Verdict and For Decree of Foreclosure, Award of Prejudgment 
Interest, Attorneys Fees and Costs, three supporting joint affidavits in support of motion for 
award of attorneys fees, Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, and the related motion 
papers, and having fully considered Plaintiffs opposing memoranda, and having heard oral 
argument from Plaintiffs and Defendant's respective counsel on January 31, 2005, and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters judgment consistent with the court's 
Memorandum Decision entered February 4, 2005. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED AND DECLARED 
as follows: 
1. Bill Hart is awarded judgment in his favor and against Joel Sill, whose address is 
28 White Pine Canyon Road, Park City, Utah 84060, in the amount of $314,500, plus 
prejudgment interest of $98,480.88, plus costs of $5,598.92, plus reasonable attorneys fees in the 
amount of $199,225.75, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, which are taxed as costs in this 
matter, for a total judgment of $617,805.55. 
2. This judgment shall bear interest from entry hereof at the post-judgment rate 
specified in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(3). 
3. The Notice of Lien dated January 30, 2002, recorded on January 31, 2002, as 
Entry 00609900, in Book 1432, Page 511-512, of the official records of the Summit County 
Recorder, is a valid and enforceable lien against the property located in Summit County, State of 
Utah, described as follows (the "Property"), and Defendant Bill Hart is entitled to a foreclosure 
of his lien on the Property: 
All of Homestead No. 15, The Colony At White Pine Canyon, Phase 1 
Amended Final Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on 
file and of record in the office of the Summit County Recorder. 
Also together with and subject to all rights, benefits, encumbrances 
and obligations set forth in the grant of easements recorded September 
28, 1998 as Entry No. 518627 in Book 1186 at Page 128 of the official 
records. 
Parcel #CWPC-15-AM 
4. The Property is hereby foreclosed pursuant to Defendant's lien, and the Property, 
or such amounts as may be sufficient to pay the amounts due under this judgment and decree, 
together with accruing costs and interest, be sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit 
County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by Utah law for the sale of real property as in 
the case of foreclosure of mortgages. Plaintiff Joel Sill, and Third Party Defendants, including 
Kallie J. Sill, and each of them, and all persons and entities claiming by, through or under them 
or any of them, have no further estate, right, title, lien, or other interest of any kind in, on, or to 
the Property, except a right of redemption as the case may be as provided by law. Provided, 
however, that the Property be foreclosed and sold subject to any unnamed, non-party person or 
entity that holds any mortgage or interest that is prior to the interests of Defendant. Any party to 
this action may bid for the Property at the sale. 
5. That all persons claiming under Plaintiff Joel Sill or Third Party Defendant Kallie 
Sill, whose interests do not appear of record in the Summit County Recorder's Office as of 
Defendant's filing of the lis pendens of this action, are barred and foreclosed of all right, title, 
interest and equity of redemption in the Property. 
6. The Sheriff, upon sale of the Property, shall distribute the proceeds from the sale 
as follows: 
a. to pay the Sheriffs cost of sale, disbursements and commissions; 
b. to pay to Bill Hart or his attorneys the accrued and accruing costs and 
attorneys fees of this action, together with the remaining amounts owing Bill Hart for the 
total judgment as set forth in paragraph 1 above; 
c. any surplus after payment of the amount set forth above be accounted for and 
paid over by the Sheriff to the Clerk of Court pending further order by this Court. 
7. The person or entity purchasing the Property at the sheriffs sale thereof shall 
receive a Certificate of Sale from the sheriff and shall, subject to the rights of redemption, be 
entitled to immediate possession of the Property and the right to receive and collect all rents 
therefrom. 
8. After the time allowed by law for redemption has expired, the Sheriff shall 
execute and deliver a Sheriffs Deed (the "Deed") to the purchaser at the sheriffs sale or the 
person entitled thereto, as provided for by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The grantee named 
therein shall thereupon be entitled to and have possession of the Property. 
9. Defendant Bill Hart is hereby awarded a deficiency judgment against Plaintiff 
Joel Sill for any and all deficiencies remaining due after applying the net proceeds derived from 
the foreclosure sale of the Property to the judgment as herein provided. 
10. This judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys 
fees incurred by Defendant Bill Hart in collecting this judgment, by execution or otherwise, as 
shall be established by affidavit. 
DATED this fHtey of Jjgfr 
Approved as to form: 
Third Distric 
.-'•••. ^ > 
T&toifl. 
Christina I. Miller, Esq. 
David B. Thompson, Esq. 
Miller, Vance & Thompson, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Joel Sill 
s. Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
Attorneys for Third Party Defendant Kallie J. Sill 
